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In recent years, governments have grown increasingly concerned with the spend-
ing decisions of lower tier governments within their jurisdiction. In particular, some
higher tier governments have introduced strategies which are explicitly intended to
deter lower tier governments from taxing or spending beyond subscribed levels. Var-
ious reasons have been put forward for introducing such control mechanisms. These
include compensating for the incentives which local councils might face to over-provide
public services, or provide them ine±ciently (Shapiro et al, 1979), as part of an over-
all strategy for reducing public spending as a share of national GDP, adjusting the
boundaries between the public and private sectors and adjusting the balance of fund-
ing for local spending between taxation and user charges. Whatever the reason for
central government action, the limitation of local expenditures or taxes has become
more widespread in both the United States and the United Kingdom over the last
two decades. In the United States, the majority of the states now exert some form
of spending or property tax limitation, and since 1985 a number of local councils in
the UK have been subject to a strict limitation of their expenditures. In the UK the
limitations, known as \caps", were imposed by central government according to an
\over-spending" criteria and during the 1980s about 5 per cent of local councils in
each year were capped.
There is a relatively large empirical literature on the impact of spending and prop-
erty tax limitations in the United States (see Shannon and Fischer (1976), Rafuse
(1979), Preston and Ichniowski (1991), Poterba and Ruebin (1995) and ACIR(1995)).
By contrast, there has been very little empirical work on the e®ectiveness of capping
and of the impact of the policy on council's budgets and spending patterns in the
U.K1. This lack of evidence is especially surprising given the availability of a rich set
of information available at local council level, for example data exists on the budgets
of local councils at a disaggregated level plus a large set of potential co-variates.
The aim of this paper is to study the impact of the capping regime in England
and Wales on local council spending. We focus on the eight year period from 1983-84
through to 1990-91, since during this period there exists a comparison group of councils
which were not directly a®ected by the capping arrangements. We test a number of
hypotheses concerning the impact of capping on local authority budgets. First, we
investigate whether \capped" local councils did set lower budgets than would otherwise
be the case. Second, since local councils in Britain provide a range of major services
such as primary and secondary education, social services, highway maintenance as well
as other municipal services, a second aim of this paper has been to investigate whether
the impact of expenditure limitation has fallen more heavily on some services than
on others. Finally, we examine measures of service standards or outputs for some
1Duncan and Smith (1995) examined the assessment of spending need in the presence of expen-
diture limitation provisions using data from the U.K.key local services to identify whether control of spending has been achieved at the
expense of any noticeable deterioration in the quality of services o®ered by \capped"
local councils.
In order to carry out this empirical study we have created a comprehensive lon-
gitudinal data set covering over 450 local councils in England and Wales during the
period 1983-1990. The data set includes a range of budgetary information for local
councils, such as total spending, spending on individual services, grant income, possi-
ble indicators of service quality such as pupil-teacher ratios in schools, information on
local politics, time varying information on local economic conditions, a range of demo-
graphic information and a set of capping indicators. A key objective of constructing
such a panel data set, aside from the advantage of over 3000 data points, is to control
for time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity between local councils and the e®ects
of uniform shocks impacting on all local councils in particular years. To address con-
cerns that the non-random selection of authorities for expenditure limitation might
reduce the value of our comparison group and bias our results, we exploit additional
information in the data set on the actual criteria used by central government to select
which authorities were to be capped but which might reasonably be expected not to
exert an independent in°uence on local budgetary decisions.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we brie°y outline both the
structure of local government in England and Wales during the period of the study
and how the government's capping policy operated. We provide some descriptive
information on the data set and compare the spending levels of capped and uncapped
councils over the period. Section 3 sets out the empirical model and identi¯es the
key estimation issues. Section 4 provides the results of our estimation work and a
discussion of our ¯ndings. Section 5 concludes.
2. UK Local Government and Capping.
During the period from 1983 to 1990, the local government structure in England
and Wales had an upper tier of \county councils" which were responsible for the
provision of the major local services such as education, social services and transport
and a lower tier of \district councils" which provide a range of municipal services
such as parks and refuse collection. The major exception to this general pattern was
within London and the major metropolitan areas where the districts were responsible
for a greater number of services, especially after 1986, when the county tier, including
the Greater London Council, were abolished. In 1984 central government introduced
legislation which gave it powers to cap the expenditure of local councils in England
and Wales. The powers were ¯rst introduced in the ¯nancial year 1985-86. Figure 1
shows aggregate local authority expenditure as a proportion of GDP over the period of
study. It can be seen that local government spending as a proportion of GDP declined
during the 1980s by close to two percentage points.
2Table 1 shows the number of local councils which were capped in each year2 Sev-
eral councils were capped on a number of occasions such as the London Borough of
Camden (capped 6 times during the period). The capping criteria were determined by
central government each year and could be applied if central government thought the
local council's budget \to be excessive with regard to general economic conditions".
Speci¯cally, central government would set a maximum budget which the council could
set the following year if it deemed the local authority to have set a budget which was
excessive compared to a central assessment of spending need, and which represented
too great a year on year increase in spending.
Figure 2 shows the expenditure levels for those councils responsible for major ser-
vices such as education, social services and transport grouped according to whether
they were capped or uncapped in 1987-88. It can be seen that, in general, capped
councils were higher spenders in per capita terms than uncapped councils. The fact
that some councils remained uncapped but had a greater level of per capita expendi-
ture than councils of a similar type which were capped can be explained by a number
of factors. Some uncapped councils may have had relatively high assessments of their
needs by central government. Others may have high but slowly growing or even
decreasing expenditure and so would have escaped the capping arrangements. The
appendix provides further descriptive information on the data and details on their
sources.
To study the impact of capping on local councils, we have created a panel of local
councils in England and Wales over the 8 year period from 1983 through to 1990.
Throughout the period, we observe 43 di®erent councils being capped on a total of
96 occasions according to the standard criteria, of which 18 were capped more than
once. A total of 413 councils were never capped during this period.
Whether capping e®ectively restricted the spending of capped councils and/or
a®ected the spending patterns across various services is clearly an empirical issue.
which we address in the following section.
3. Modelling Local Council Spending under Capping.
We stated earlier that there is very little evidence of the e®ect of capping on
local council's spending using data from the United Kingdom3. Most of the empirical
literature relates to the United States. This is neatly summarised in by the Advisory
Council on Intergovernmental Relations (1995). Broadly, the US empirical literature
has found that expenditure or tax limitations do have a negative impact on expenditure
by local jurisdictions. In particular, Preston and Ichniowski (1979), using a panel
2Appendix Table 3 provides information on which councils had their expenditure capped in each
year.
3Duncan and Smith (1995) is the only UK study of note. Their empirical analysis, however, was
limited to a single cross section of lower tier district councils.
3data set covering municipalities from all 50 states, found that limits had a signi¯cant
negative impact on property tax revenue growth and a smaller, though still signi¯cant
impact on local government revenue growth. Shannon, Bell and Fisher (1976), using
a cross-section of data from all 50 states in 1974, found that per capita expenditure
was 6%-8% lower in those states that had some form of local tax rate or levy limit.
This study also looks at the impact on per capita expenditures in the United
Kingdom but it adds to this literature further by assessing the impact of capping on
spending on individual local services such as education and social services and various
possible indicators of the quality of local service provision.
Our starting point is to consider the problem for a median voter who is residing in
local authority i and is assumed to consume a composite private good x and a locally
provided public service z. di is a vector of characteristics which re°ects the demo-
graphic composition of the median voter and authority speci¯c tastes. The median




U = Ui(x;z;di) (3.1)
subject to the budget constraint shown in (3.2) where the individual's tax price for a
unit of the service is and is assumed to be equal to wi
Ni where wi is the cost of providing
a unit of the service and Ni is the number of taxpayers in the jurisdiction. Spending
on local services per head is accounted for by ei which is simply the product of the
cost of services, ¼i; and the volume of local public service provided by the council, zi:
The individual's private income is yi and the external support per head of population
from central government is depicted by si.
xi + ¼izi = yi + si (3.2)
The local authority budget, ei; is constrained to the expenditure limit, ¹ ei; if the
council has its budget capped as in (3.3). We shall discuss the implications of the
factors in°uencing the decision to cap when discussing endogeneity issues later in this
section.
ei · ¹ ei if the council is capped (3.3)
It follows from the above maximisation problem that the desired level of spending
per capita, e¤
i can be expressed as a function of the characteristics and tax price faced
by the median voter, and local incomes. We allow for the possible existence of °y-
paper e®ects - that local public spending may be more responsive to additional grant
income to the local authority than an equivalent amount of additional income to local
citizens (see Gramlich, 1977; Fischer, 1982) - by including local personal incomes, yi;
and external support, si, separately:
4e
¤
i = ¼iDi(yi;si;¼i;di) (3.4)
We have stated that it is central government that determines whether a local
council is capped or not. Clearly, the above equation will be constrained to ¹ ei if the
council is capped. The ¯rst question we pose in this study is whether capping made
any di®erence to a local council's spending during the 1980's. In the ideal, we would
like to know what the spending of the capped councils would have been if they were left
free to determine their own spending levels. To test whether capping did in fact reduce
a council's spending compared to what it might otherwise have been we consider the
following equation which is an expression for actual local council spending per capita,
eit;in a given period.
eit = (1 ¡ Capit) e
¤
it + Capit ¹ ei + ±it (3.5)
The above indicates that a council will only deviate its spending from its desired
level if it is capped, i.e. Capit=1 or otherwise Capit= 0, or if there is some shock
the size ±it. We use the empirical speci¯cation in (3.6) as the basis for our analysis
of the impact that a council being selected for capping has on a local council's real
expenditure per head in period t, eit: nCapit is a term which picks up the number
of times a local authority's budget has been capped, ³i represents any time-invariant
speci¯c e®ects on local spending such as historical and cultural di®erences between
councils, ¿t picks up any uniform stochastic shocks which impact on council spending
in particular years. During this period, variations in the tax base and in the variable
costs of providing services between councils were fully compensated through a com-
prehensive system of equalising grants. As a result, the tax price does not enter our
equation.
eit = ® + µnCapit + Áyit + °sit + ´
0
dit + ¿t + ³i + "it (3.6)
In order to control for the e®ect on expenditure of unobserved time-invariant factors
that are likely to be correlated with the observed time-varying in°uences we estimate
our model in ¯rst di®erences form.
¢eit = µCapit + Á¢yit + °¢sit + ´
0
¢dit + ±t + ¢"it (3.7)
The above variables are all in per capita terms. eit is the log of per capita council
spending ¯nanced out of local taxes and general grant support from central govern-
ment. It is this de¯nition of council spending that was capped by central government.
Unfortunately, reliable district level information on incomes does not exist in the UK
so we have used county level information on incomes (yjt) where the ith district is
covered by the jth county. We have also controlled for the in°uence of various other
locally varying economic variables such as the proportion of the population who are
unemployed (uit) and the number of ¯rms registered for Value Added Tax per capita
5(vit);which may proxy for changing patterns of business activity within a local area.
We include in dit the proportion within each ¯ve year age group from under ¯ve to
over 80 (ait):This is particularly important since education and social services account
for a large proportion of council spending and these budgets are focused on the young
and the elderly. We exploit a range of information on political in°uences on the local
council such as whether the council is controlled by the right of centre Conservative
party (Cit) and the share of the seats on the council held by both the Conservatives
(Csit) and the left of centre Labour party (Lsit). We also include information on
which councils face elections in each year (Eit) and a set of time dummies, (±t):Thus,
the form of the equation when estimating the expenditure equations throughout this
study is the following:
¢eit = µCapit + Á¢yit + Ãuit + !vit + °¢sit +
´1Cit + ´2¢Csit + ´3¢Lsit + »
0¢ait + ±t + ¢"it (3.8)
One issue which arises in the estimation of our model in ¯rst di®erences is the
possible endogeneity of the capping dummy. This is because a council may be capped
in year t if its absolute level of spending in year t-1 in relation to both central gov-
ernment's estimate of its spending need in year t-1, and the percentage change in
its expenditure since year t-2 has been deemed \excessive". This clearly violates the
assumption that the explanatory variables should be orthogonal to the residual term
when we estimate the model in ¯rst di®erences form. To address this issue, we pro-
pose instrumenting the capping dummy, using the other explanatory variables as in
the main regression, which we denote Xit; together with an indicator of the level of the
council's spending (relative to central government's assessment of its spending needs)
lagged two years, OV ERSPENDit¡2;and an indicator of whether the local council
was capped in previous years (since the rules were tougher for serial o®enders)4. Thus,
the form of our ¯rst round regression is :
Capit = ¯1Capit¡1 + ¯2Capit¡2 + ¯3OV ERSPENDit¡2 + ¯4Xit + uit (3.9)
Identi¯cation is achieved by assuming that the variables excluded from the main
regression (3.8) are orthogonal to the error term ¢"it
5: To correct for the endogene-
ity of the capping dummy variable, a generalised residual is calculated and entered,
along with the actual value of the capping dummy, in our main regression6. Since
4We easily reject the null of instrument irrelevance at any reasonable level of signi¯cance.
5Results for the ¯rst round regression are shown in Appendix Table 2. The results are robust to
using only OVERSPEND as an identifying restriction. This does not require any assumptions to be
made concerning the dynamics of the underlying error structure.
6The generalised residual from the probit is calculated following Gourieroux et al. (1987). The
correction for endogeneity then follows the augmented regression approach discussed in Holly (1982)
and Pagan (1986).
6we have over-identifying restrictions, this can be tested formally using a Sargan test.
Throughout this study we assume income, grant and politics to be exogenous.
4. Empirical Results.
Here, we present the results using the empirical model in equation (3.7). We
estimate a ¯rst di®erences model in which changes in an authority's expenditure are
explained by the impact of capping and a range of other in°uences on local spending
such as changes in grant income, local economic and political in°uences, and whether
local councils face an election. We include a full set of year dummies to capture
any macro-economic in°uences which may have impacted on local councils uniformly
within particular years. Estimation in ¯rst di®erences controls for any unobservable
characteristics of a local council which are invariant over time.
4.1. Aggregate Spending Results
Table 2 shows the results of our estimated equations. Using data for English and
Welsh local councils during the period from 1983 through to 1990, column 1 shows the
results from an OLS regression in ¯rst di®erences which indicates that capped councils
may spend 7% less in real terms7 than councils spending at their desired level. The IV
results in column 2 show that once we take into account the endogeneity of the capping
decision the reduction in spending increases by a further percentage point to 8%. This
¯gure is reduced to 6% if we include use of reserves in the de¯nition of aggregate
council spending, suggesting councils may have avoided some of the consequences of
being capped by running down their reserves. Interestingly all of these results are
within the 6%-8% range of expenditure reduction found in the empirical literature
from the United States.
The other explanatory variables all appear to impact local spending in the direction
we might expect. Increases in central government grant and the share of council seats
won by the Labour party have a positive impact on spending. The former result
suggests that changes in central grant have a greater impact on local spending than
on local tax rates. Increases in the Conservative party share of the seats on the
council, switches to Conservative party control, and the proximity of local elections
all have a negative impact. In the latter case, this accords with evidence that councils
maintain spending levels in election years whilst reducing tax rates by running down
reserves. We note that spending growth is higher amongst those councils which provide
education and social services, the demand for which is likely to have a relatively
high income elasticity of demand. The other dummy variables control for shocks to
7Spending refers to spending ¯nanced from central government grant and local tax revenues but
not from running down reserves.
7particular groups of councils in particular years resulting from a reorganisation of the
structure of local government in the metropolitan and London areas in the mid 1980's.
4.2. Speci¯c Services
One might expect that the placing of an external constraint on local council spend-
ing choices would have a di®erential impact between services. Indeed, if we were to
view the reduction in local council budgets in much the same way as a reduction in
local incomes, then we might expect the services which would bear the brunt of the
cuts to be those where demand had the highest income elasticity. A limited empirical
literature on the impact of expenditure limitations on the composition of local spend-
ing already exists. Galles, Long and Sexton (1995) found that education spending was
lower as a result of Proposition 13, but this largely re°ects decisions made by the state
government to apply expenditure limits to school districts. Noam (1979) considered
the impact of local spending cuts on the composition of budgets, using referendum
data from jurisdictions within the Swiss Canton of Basle. He estimated the elasticity
of ¯ve types of spending to increases in spending, ¯nding that all were normal goods,
and some evidence that spending on education and social programmes had an income
elasticity of greater than one.
One possible complication to such a simplistic model would be the possibilities
for local residents to substitute between public and private alternatives for certain
services, since capping, if it reduces the budget of the local council by constraining
local tax rates, e®ectively increases the income available to spend on private goods.
Many local public services compete directly with private alternatives such as leisure
centres. For other services, such as libraries or police services, alternative providers
such as book-shops, private security ¯rms or security apparatus also exist. In other
local services, cuts in council spending can, at least in part, be substituted by \top-up"
funding from users of the service, such as the purchase of school books by parents.
Thus, a council faced by an external budgetary constraint might be expected to place
the largest burden of any expenditure cuts on services with high income elasticities
of demand such as education, or those where the income elasticity of demand for
public provision may be tempered by the possibility of substituting for private sector
alternatives.
Capping appears to have had a substantial impact on education spending, the most
important local service in terms of budget shares. Table 3 shows that capping appears
to reduce spending on the three major local services. Using the instrumental variables
approach outlined above, we ¯nd that capping reduces spending on education and
social services by around 4% and on transport by 7%.
Table 4 shows the estimated impact of the capping arrangements on spending on a
range of the minor municipal services such as leisure services, libraries, refuse collection
and parks. We have a far greater number of observations for the impact of capping on
8some of these services since they are provided by both small district councils in the
shire areas as well as the major urban councils within London and the metropolitan
areas. We ¯nd signi¯cant e®ects of capping on spending for some services such as
parks (5%) and libraries (3%) but not for others such as museums or refuse collection,
where the coe±cient on the capping variable is negative but not signi¯cant, although
we did not have access to information on which councils had contracted out services
such as refuse collection during this period.
4.3. Service Quality
Finally, table 5 shows the impact of capping on a limited range of indicators
of the standards of service provided by local councils. This suggests that capping
a local council may lead to increases in class sizes in both primary and secondary
school levels, suggesting that lower education spending has been associated with a
reduction in the quality of local services. This is consistent with evidence from U.S.
data (Figilio, 1997). The picture on the discretionary provision of free nursery places
for the under 5's is less clear, once we use IV techniques. We could not detect any
impact on the amount of hours which councils devote to home-help services (caring
for typically elderly individuals living at home) although capping did appear to lead
to less expenditure on administrative sta®. Capping appears to reduce both sta±ng
levels in local libraries and the level of book lending activity.
5. Conclusions.
We have presented evidence that expenditure limitation or \capping" has had a
signi¯cant negative impact on expenditure using data from the United Kingdom over
the period from 1983 through to 1990. We found evidence that capping may reduce
overall local council spending by close to 8%.
Expenditure limitation appears to have had a di®erential impact between di®erent
types of local services. There is evidence that education, which represents roughly
40% of total council spending, has taken the brunt of the impact of capping. We have
some evidence that class sizes were higher then they otherwise would have been in
those councils which have been capped.
In addition, we ¯nd signi¯cant e®ects of capping on spending for some services
such as parks and libraries but not for others such as car parks or refuse collection,
although the sign of the coe±cient on capping is always negative. We also ¯nd that
expenditure limitation is associated with reduced levels of both sta±ng and book
lending in local libraries.
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107. Appendix
7.1. Data Sources
² Details of local councils spending (both total and disaggregated), populations
and block grant income came from Finance & General Statistics which is pub-
lished annually by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance Accountants (CIPFA).
² Indicators of service quality, additional spending data and cost/revenue ratios for
certain services came from Local Government Comparative Statistics, published
annually by CIPFA.
² Political data was obtained from the Local Government Chronicle Elections Cen-
tre.
² Local economic and demographic variables were obtained from the National On-
line Manpower Information System (NOMIS) and Economic Trends, published
by the O±ce for National Statistics (ONS).
² Details of the councils that were `capped' in each year came from the relevant
Rate Limitation Report or from press releases, published by the Department Of
Environment.
7.2. Description
A dummy variable was created for whether or not a council was capped in that ¯nancial
year.
The political variables used in the regressions are the percentage share of the seats
on the council for both the Conservative and Labour parties, and a dummy variable
for whether the Conservatives held political control of the council. The political data
corresponds to control of the council during the period when annual budgets are
determined. To control for the e®ect of elections on spending, a dummy variable was
used for whether there was an election in the May following the budget. Any additional
e®ect of this being an all-out election was also controlled for with an additional dummy.
Both expenditure and grant used in the regressions are de°ated using a local au-
thority pay and price index to 1990 prices and calculated per capita. Total expenditure
is the amount raised from local taxation (domestic and non-domestic rates), and the
block grant, it does not include expenditure ¯nanced by speci¯c grants, user charges
or the use of reserves. The ¯gure for grant is the total unhyphothecated grant received
from central government, including the London equalisation grant, and also national
non-domestic rates in 1990. Also included in the regressions is an interaction with
grant and the dummy variable for those councils providing front line services. This is
to pick up the potential of di®ering e®ects of grant on expenditure in larger councils.
Unemployment and the number of ¯rms registered for VAT are both converted to
per capita terms. The income variable used is average disposable household income,
11calculated at place of work. For this reason we use district level data in the metropol-
itan areas of England, whereas in Wales and shire England the county level ¯gure is
used. Income is also de°ated to 1990 prices
The e®ect of the demographic composition of the local area on spending was con-
trolled for using the proportion of the population in each of seventeen age groups
(under 5, 5-9, 10-14 through to 75-79 and then those over 80).
A dummy variable was included for councils which provided front line services
such as education. This is because it is possible that councils that provide di®erent
packages of services (with di®erent income elasticities) to experience di®erent growth
in expenditure over time. Dummy variables were used to control for changes in the
structure and the responsibilities of local councils. An additional indicator controlled
for grant changes in 1990, which largely resulted from changes in the local tax base.
Appendix table 1 shows the mean values of each of the independent variables of
interest, and also provides an indication of their distribution between councils.
12